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Spheres of influence: A few reflections on the concept 





In the frame of the Ukrainian crisis the question of spheres of influence has returned to 
political discourse. This may be an awkward subject, but what if we only deny the 
existence of such power constellations as spheres of influence? Do spheres of influence 
exist, or are they relics of history, and mere rhetoric? And if they exist, where can we find 
them? The hypothesis in this article is that instead of being a tangible reality, spheres of 
influence are obscure and contested political constructions, which nevertheless can have 
an impact on political behaviour. To demonstrate this, the article will first introduce a few 
examples of the current use of the concept. Secondly, a few remarks follow concerning 
the different IR schools of thought, and conceptual history as a method. Next, the article 
turns to discussing a few dictionaries and the empirical material for the present inquiry, 
which consists of recent textbooks, i.e. the current political science curriculum in one 
particular university, at the University of Tampere, Finland. More empirical cases deal 
with the division of Africa, the post-WWII situation, and the Hungarian revolution of 
1956. 
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Introduction 
In the frame of the Ukrainian crisis the question of spheres of influence has returned to 
political discourse. Both the EU and Russia have denied the existence of their respective 
“spheres”, but at the same time accused each other of building such entities. Susanna Hast 
(2012) has recently noted that it is impossible to find a non-Russian scholar who does not 
take it for granted that a sphere of influence should not belong to Russian foreign policy. 
The “sphere” has become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, however, a mantra. 
According to Hast, there is no room for discussing the phenomenon, and the only 
justifiable way to approach it is “to avoid any references to it, or to formulate new 
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expressions” (Hast 2012, 15, 33, 287). Although I hesitate to accept Hast’s conclusion as 
to the need to think of “spheres” as a kind of potential model, she has captured a crucial 
problem for conceptual history. What if we only deny the existence of such power 
constellations as spheres of influence?  
Thus, do spheres of influence exist, or are they relics of history and mere rhetoric? 
And if they exist, where can we find them? The hypothesis is that instead of being a 
tangible reality, spheres of influence are obscure and contested political constructions, 
which nevertheless can have an impact on political behaviour. Thus, the paper examines 
several classical cases from the colonization of Africa, through Churchill’s attempt to 
gain influence in East Central Europe, to the Hungarian revolution of 1956. I will, on the 
one hand, use conceptual history and inquire about the linguistic use of the concept. 
Secondly, I will examine if Hungary, and 1956 in particular, plays a role in IR textbooks 
anymore.  
At first, I will introduce a few examples of the current use of the concept. 
Secondly, I have a few remarks concerning the different IR schools, and conceptual 
history as a method. Next, I will discuss a few dictionaries and my empirical material, 
which consists of recent textbooks, i.e. the current political science curriculum in one 
particular university, at the University of Tampere, Finland. More empirical cases deal 
with the division of Africa, the post-WWII situation, and the Hungarian revolution of 
1956. The source material is based on textbooks and dictionaries, documents, and 
newspaper material. 
 
Political thought vs. different IR schools 
Although Susanna Hast is not a conceptual historian, her starting point has similarities 
with the nature of such an approach: she focuses on the use of the concept of spheres of 
influence (2012: 281). Indeed, an ad hoc Google search (2014) concerning a few Finnish 
and British newspapers revealed a clear peak in its use in the aftermath of the Crimean 
crisis. When it comes to „sphere of interest,” Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat both 
seem to connect the concept to Russia and the crisis in Ukraine. (cf. Helsingin Sanomat, 
March 29, 2014; Nyyssönen, 2014). In the Economist, however, there were not many 
references to spheres of interest, whilst sphere of influence is connected either to ideas 
such as China’s economic might, or specific countries such as Congo, Rwanda, Russia, 
Brazil or the United States. 
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In conceptual history, sphere of influence is not one of those positive concepts, 
like democracy or freedom, which all political actors eagerly try to monopolize. Instead, 
I argue that it is obviously pejorative in nature, and as such it has served as a convenient 
label to depict a political opponent in Russia. Thus, the aim is not to argue whether 
spheres of influence de facto “exist,” but to claim that a notion of these spheres can be 
found in political thought. Someone’s political thought is not necessary fully coherent, 
but it is full of perceptions, prejudices and even stereotypes. Hence, a sphere of influence 
is an ideal type, and a discourse with serious political consequences, as it can make an 
impact on behaviour. 
In this sense conceptual history is not necessarily bound to any of the major IR 
schools. It merely studies the “isms” and the schools themselves – theories like “Realism” 
and “Liberalism” are rough models to stress particular notions, such as security or 
international organizations. I might be labelled a “post-positivist” as in my understanding 
the basis of international relations is rather social than material (cf. also Austin, 1962; 
Wendt, 1999).  
History matters, meanwhile, and recently there has even been a discourse of IR’s 
historical (re)turn. I accept Hobson’s and Lawson’s view that history has always been a 
core feature of the international imagination. The English school is an especially 
important interface between the study of history and IR. However, there are similarities 
to other fields as well, such as in neoclassical realist studies and constructivist approaches. 
I agree with Elman and Elman that it is not always easy to distinguish historians and 
political scientists; some political science reads very much like history with its attendant 
focus on contingency, agency, historically circumscribed causal arguments, and 
particularistic explanations. Similarly, some ‘new’ history has moved toward an analytic 
approach that looks and reads quite like political science (Hobson and Lawson, 2008: 
415–435; Keene, 2008: 381; Elman & Elman, 2008: 357–358). A case such as Hungary 
1956 is already so well documented and studied that the focus could, by now, be turned 
towards the natura of the use of this history – along with its misuse and abuse (Nyyssönen, 
2016).  
Hobson and Lawson have reframed E.H. Carr’s famous question by applying it to 
international relations: “What is History in IR?” For them, there are four ideal types, and 
the answer varies according to where the researcher is located on a continuum connecting 
these. The degree of willingness to generalize matters: “History without historicism”, like 
its neorealist version, generalizes most, whilst “radical historicism” and “traditional 
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history” avoid generalizations and represent the other extreme point on the continuum. 
There is, however, an “historicist historical sociology”, which overlaps with all of the 
other three approaches. Although this category looks somewhat loose, it includes such 
formidable figures as Quentin Skinner, E.H. Carr and R.G. Collingwood. This ideal type 
accepts that history is knowable, but produced within a certain time and place, and subject 
to the interpretations of its practitioners (Hobson and Lawson, 2008: 415-435). 
Constructivist history is essentially “Skinnerian” in nature, distinguishing itself 
from realist materialism, and the history of ideas. Here the construction of history takes 
place on two levels: on the one hand, politicians construct their own view of history; on 
the other, scholars do the same afterwards. In this approach, speaking and using language 
is already an act, as the speaker simultaneously says something and does something. Thus, 
the present study is Skinnerian in a sense that it tries to identify the questions of a certain 
time, and these may be plausibly established when knowing the contemporary context. 
Moreover, I posit that the use of political language is the central object of the history of 
political study (Reus-Smit, 2008: 395-414). 
Conceptual history is not (yet) an IR theory, but through post-positivist 
approaches and constructivism it opens new IR discourses. A crucial problem is whether 
a phenomenon may have existed before it was linguistically constructed and named? This 
may be illustrated with reference to the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, wherein Spain and 
Portugal divided the newly discovered lands outside Europe. In the agreement, mediated 
by the Pope, they concluded that specific territories “belong” to them, and may even 
“belong [to them] forever” (Treaty between…). The agreement made an impact on 
political behaviour particularly in Latin America (Brazil has the Portuguese legacy, whilst 
the rest of the continent speaks predominantly Spanish), and in Portuguese colonialism 
directed to the “East” i.e. to Africa and Asia. Whether this was already an arrangement 
of spheres of influence, however, is not explicitly answered by the treaty. 
According to Reinhart Koselleck (1979), a scholar either uses the linguistic 
conventions of the time period of interest, or categories created ex post. I think that we 
need both approaches at the same time. Contemporary expressions’ relevance has to be 
discovered not only in the sources but in the historian’s composition, too. Reference to 
the linguistic conventions of the time period studied do not lead sources to dictate, but 
offers the advantage of decreasing the risk of anachronisms, and it enriches our whole 
picture of history. In this paper, discourses are traced from past treaties and speeches in 
which their manifestation in speech acts is noted.  
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The concept and its use: From Berlin to Morocco 
At first sight, „sphere of influence” is not a common concept at all. In the library 
University of Tampere a quick perusal of textbooks reveals that only a few indexes 
included the concept: Introduction to Global Politics (2008) is an exception, and connects 
the concept to Eastern Europe, as Stalin’s and Churchill’s WWII conversations in October 
1944. Surprisingly the term is not included in the textbook of „isms” either, i.e. 
International Relations Theories (2007), presenting the discipline and its diversity from 
classical realism to post-colonialism and green theory. More surprising is that not even A 
history of International Relations theory (1992) included the concept in its index.   
According to Encyclopaedia Britannica (1968: 12-13), sphere of influence is “A 
diplomatic term that signifies a claim by the state to exclusive control within a foreign 
territory.” This control could be found in economic or military matters, in politics, or it 
may concern the overall government of the territory. The dictionary also mentions cases 
such as the Monroe Doctrine and the Soviet policy. Moreover, Frederick L. Schuman 
(1934) linked the concept to African imperialism since the 1880s. With time, the 
expression extended to cover a close relationship between small European states and great 
powers with which they are not in a formal alliance, and whose protectorate they are not 
under. For example, Austria and Hungary were said to be within the Italian sphere of 
influence already in 1934 (Schuman, 1950: 297).  
Also known as the Congo Conference, the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 
regulated colonization and trade in Africa. Under a humanitarian façade diplomats laid 
down rules for seeking colonies, but in the end they could not prevent rivalry. Sometimes 
it is claimed that the term „sphere of influence” emerged at this conference, but in the 
closing document, in the General Act of the Berlin Conference, the term does not yet 
occur. Instead, they repeat twice, in Articles 6 and 9, the formula of exercising “sovereign 
rights or influence in the territories” [the second time: “in the afore said territories”]. 
(General Act of…, 1885). 
However, there is an agreement between Great Britain and Germany (1885), 
which is considered to be the first to make use of the term (Encyclopaedia Britannica 
1968, 12), referring to “a separation and definition of their respective spheres of influence 
in the territories of the Gulf of Guinea.” Both powers agreed to cede all protectorates, 
which they had already established beyond these limitations to the other party. The 
encyclopaedia stresses that agreements of this kind dealt with territories that were 
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ungoverned and thus could be acquired by whatever nation (ibid.). In the headline of the 
agreement they still speak about “spheres of action” instead of “influence.” If we regard 
this as accidental, we can compare the headline (1885) to a later agreement signed in 
Berlin in 1890: “Arrangement between Great Britain and Germany, respecting Zanzibar, 
Heligoland, and the Spheres of Influence of the two Countries in Africa” (cf. BFSP Vol. 
76: 772–778; BFSP Vol. 92: 35–37). The latter document was signed on July 1, 1890, 
which coincides with the end of the Bismarckian “Realpolitik” – the old Chancellor had 
resigned only a few months earlier. 
In 1907 Britain and Russia divided Persia and thus nded “The Great Game”. The 
dispute had unfolded between Britain and Russia for decades over Afghanistan and 
neighbouring territories such as Tibet and Persia. The most important of these, the 
agreement concerning Persia, did not eliminate all competition between the two powers 
with respect to their policies in Iran. Although they did not use any expression referring 
to spheres, they argued that a line existed, i.e. beyond a certain line they would not offer 
any concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.  
Furthermore, Britain and France settled many long-standing issues in the Entente 
cordiale in 1904. This “cordial understanding” was soon tested by German Weltpolitik, 
and the subsequent Moroccan Crises in 1905 and in 1911. During the first crisis Kaiser 
Wilhelm II challenged the French by backing Morocco’s sovereignty. However, in 
Algeciras, in 1906, German imperial aims were supported only by Austria-Hungary. The 
second, i.e. the Agadir Crisis of 1911, is one of the best examples of gunboat diplomacy. 
Germany accepted France's domination in return for territory in what was known at the 
time as Neukamerun. This, as Schuman (1950, 297) noted, meant also that the 
internationalisation of spheres of interests failed: in 1912 France and Spain partitioned 
Morocco and terminated its belonging to an international sphere – only Tangier held this 
position until much later. 
What is typical of these examples is the imperialist nature and control of 
“spheres.” The African map was depicted as a vacuum, with white spots symbolising 
“unorganised” territories waiting to be filled, due to the white man’s burden. Moreover, 
it was typical that great power antagonisms played out on other continents. As a result, a 
crucial negative surplus remains in the meaning of the concept of „sphere of influence,” 
i.e. that the great powers were reorganizing territories against the will of smaller powers. 
 
Hitler, Stalin and Churchill 
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt, Договор о 
ненападении между Германией и Советским Союзом) is probably the most well-
known example of the division of spheres of interest. In the public part of the agreement 
both sides stressed that they would desist from any aggressive action and any attack on 
each other, either individually or jointly with other powers (see Article I). The idea of 
spheres was kept secret, and denied throughout the existence of the Soviet Union. Even 
so, in August 1989 the commemoration of the signing of the Pact united the people of the 
Baltic States in protest to form a chain of people over 600 kilometres long. 
Thus, the act of dividing a region between great powers was basically an 
expression of respect for each other in its own “sphere.” According to the first article of 
the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, “in a territorial and political 
rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres 
of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R.” (Der deutsch-sowjetische…). The concept 
Intressensphären was also present in the second article: “in the areas belonging to the 
Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded 
approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.” In fact the German term 
referred to interests, but the English translation equalized influence and interest. 
Regardless of the wording, in essence a kind of gentlemen’s agreement was reached to 
close eyes and give free hands to each other: “attention is called by the Soviet side to its 
interests in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these 
areas” (ibid.). 
The concept of sphere of influence was by this stage fully established. The only 
novelty was that even a post-1918 state, the Soviet Union, had by now learned the game 
of the imperialists – this is basically what Hannah Arendt commented in her famous essay 
on Hungary 1956. Nevertheless, the German-Soviet protocol was valuable only as far as 
both sides were convinced of its influence on military and political behaviour: already in 
late 1940 Hitler denied Molotov an acknowledgement of the Soviet Union’s right to 
continue activities in Finland, and in 1941 the Soviets signed an agreement with 
Yugoslavia, when Germany started to carry out the operation Barbarossa. 
Less known is that Winston Churchill also played this game, which he had learned 
already before WWI. By 1944, the future of East-Central Europe emerged as a question 
to be settled. Basically the US argued that it cannot accept any agreements, which can 
lead to division of Europe into spheres of influence (Sipos and Vida 1983, 79–82). 
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Churchill represented more balance-of-power-oriented views in his political thought, and 
without letting Roosevelt know about this, he visited the Kremlin in October 1944.  
According to Churchill’s proposition to Stalin, the Soviet Union would get 75% 
influence in Bulgaria and 90% in Romania. In Hungary and Yugoslavia influence would 
be shared 50/50. This proposal was published in Churchill’s memoirs in 1953, but its 
more fatal step only in the 1970s. One day after Churchill made his proposal, Eden and 
Molotov agreed on Romania (sharing 90–10) and Greece (10–90), exchanging a 
subjugated role in the former for a dominant position in the other. Bulgaria’s status varied 
from 75 to 90% influence for the Soviet Union, until eventually the two sides agreed on 
80/20 in favour of the Soviet Union. Molotov had demanded 75% in Yugoslavia, but no 
changes were made there. The final result in the case of Hungary was 80/20 to the benefit 
of the Soviet Union. (Gati 1986, 29–31).  
On the one hand, “percentages” were as impossible an idea as it would be to say 
that a woman is partly pregnant (Max, 1985: 20). On the other hand, Churchill was an 
old-school politician, who tried to negotiate and achieve even the impossible. Churchill, 
however, was not alone with his thoughts looking ahead to a divison of spheres. There is 
an intriguing example in this respect in a relatively new IR textbook concerning how 
George Kennan, reflecting the spirit of the time, writing in a letter to his fellow diplomat 
Charles E. Bohlen, asked: “Why should we not make a decent and definite compromise… 
divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence – keep ourselves out of the Russia sphere 
and keep the Russians out of ours?” (Mansbach & Taylor, 2012: 109). Thus, the idea of 
a sphere mattered not only in Greece but for example in Iran as well: When Iran 
nationalized oil facilities, this led to the 1953 CIA coup securing the Western interests 
there up until the late 1970s. In the Western hemisphere interventions were quite 
numerous, from Guatemala to Cuba, from Chile to Grenada and Panama. 
Interestingly, even according to Samuel P. Huntington’s civilisational theory, the 
basic “spheres” in the Cold War were the “Communist Bloc” and the “Free World.” South 
Africa and Portuguese African colonies, as well as Spain and Portugal themselves, 
belonged to the “free world” in Huntington’s map. He, however, did not classify countries 
such as Sweden or Finland any more in the “free world” (Huntington, 1996: 23-26). Thus, 
even the “free world” seemed to represent a kind of sphere of influence: it referred to 
close US allies, whatever their political system might have been. Even a more cynical 
definition could be found under the Reagan administration: Jeane Kirkpatrick argued in 
the early 1980s that the US could support authoritarian but not totalitarian, i.e. 
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Communist, regimes. To answer the question of whether a country like Hungary was 
totalitarian or authoritarian is not the aim of this paper. 
 
Hungary challenging the status quo in the making 
In Eisenhower’s New-Look national security policy, 1953-61, Saki Dockrill has devoted 
a chapter to “The US sphere of influence.” There Docktrill refers to a discussion in the 
National Security Council (NSC) in Washington in December 1954 about US security 
interests in the world. Reflecting on the situation in Asia, Secretary of Defence Charles 
Wilson argued that the US needed a sphere of influence, although it must not make this 
public. The President opposed “the concept of line-drawing”, because  
“…if and when you should decide on a policy of drawing a defensive line 
beyond which you tell the enemy he cannot step without risking a clash, you 
automatically give the initiative to the enemy to seize whatever falls short of the 
defensive line.” (Dockrill, 1996: 126-127) 
This statement refers in a clever manner that no particular lines existed, which 
offered space for more practical lines on whose basis decisions could be made. According 
to Dockrill, the US was not eager to act alone, but moved the Hungarian question to the 
UN, and expected support from Britain and France. Thus, if France and Britain would not 
agree, “at least we would have a reason for not acting.” On the 26th of October, 1956, 
Eisenhower revealed that he did not want to push the Soviet Union too far, and on the 
next day Dulles went to say that the US would not “look upon these nations [in East-
Central Europe] as potential military allies” (Dockrill, 1996: 160). For President 
Eisenhower Hungary was as far and unreachable as Tibet (cf. Kitts & Grad, 1993). At 
first sight, this statement may seem odd: Hungary is located in East Central Europe, and 
thus in the heart of Europe. Nevertheless, Tibet was a question of that time, as Communist 
China had occupied it as recently as in 1950, and even a revolt took place there a few 
years after the Hungarian events.  
In our IR textbooks in Tampere, Hungary is not often present, and 1956 even less 
so. However, for Kenneth Waltz and his structural realism, 1956 is a textbook example. 
In his defence of bipolarity he even mentions Dulles’ statement that one great power 
tolerates the other “because their competing interventions would pose undue danger” 
(Waltz, 1979: 208). Another classical textbook of realism, Politics Among Nations, 
reminds that 1956, 1968 and 1973 (in the Near East) all represented manifestations of a 
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balance. Therefore a possibility for détente, too, resulted from that balance (Morgenthau, 
2005: 206, 371). Thus, zero was the number of wars fought by the Cold War superpowers 
against each other. Neither did they send troops to contested areas, i.e. to Berlin, Hungary, 
Vietnam, Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan (Pinker, 2011: 259). Michael Walzer’s (2000: 
94, 292) Just and Unjust Wars has an implicit reference to 1956, when Walzer writes that 
military action can be “honourable and virtuous” but not always “prudent”. Finally, one 
interesting case is the book Peace Research, in which Peter Wallensteen offers a 
discussion of the role of the UN and its Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the crisis 
(2011: 122, 158-166).  
In the Cold War, superpower interests did not remain only regional but went 
global and beyond. A book entitled Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance, from 
Paul Keal (1984) reveals the complexity of the discourse. Unjust as the system was, 
superpowers behaved in the end in ways that suggested that they had recognized each 
other’s spheres of interest in the Western Hemisphere and in Eastern Europe (Keal, 1984). 
This is a cynical view, but „sphere of influence” makes a distinction between “takers” 
and “makers.” For example, in Finland President Kekkonen wrote in this diary in 1958 
that if Finns do not understand that they find themselves in a sphere of influence, the 
Soviet Union will show the limits to them. Such a statement, however, could not be said 
aloud in public. Even if relations do not deteriorate as a result of making statements like 
this, at the least they certainly do not improve one’s position in the international field and 
in diplomacy. A very good example is the struggle of neutrality, in which the Soviet side 
usually recognized Finnish attempts at expressing neutrality, but not neutrality itself 
(Nyyssönen, 2006: 37–38). 
Thus, while there were agreements in Teheran and Yalta, there was no treaty or 
agreement ever made that granted the whole region of Eastern Europe to the Soviets as a 
sphere of influence. However, the most important lesson that the non-response of the 
Western states to the second Soviet intervention in Hungary in November 1956 taught 
was that spheres of interest, based on the mutually accepted post-war European status 
quo, did exist and was in practice. Those who could not acknowledge the situation, were 
to be confronted again and again with new proofs, as the reform attempts of the following 
decades all failed in Eastern Europe, reiterating a fact that had become obvious in 1956 
in Hungary for the first time (Békés, 1995). 
In the aftermath of the Hungarian 1956 we can find a few references to spheres of 
influence in Finnish diplomatic papers. In July 1957, Chargé d’affaires Antti Hjelt, who 
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had witnessed the autumn in Budapest, surmised that Imre Nagy and his government had 
gone too far to the right. Although it was impossible to find the borderline between 
possible and impossible, “Moscow’s attitude to free elections in countries under its sphere 
of influence is well-known,” Hjelt wrote. Hjelt’s successor T.H. Heikkilä offered an 
assessment of Western views of the situation in September 1957. According to Heikkilä, 
Hungary did not benefit territorially in the end of the WWII, contrary to the other 
“satellites” of the Soviet Union. Therefore gratitude to the Soviets could not grow 
significantly, particularly when the Communist leadership was fully under the control of 
Moscow. Exactly for this reason, Heikkilä speculates that Hungary would be a very 
difficult problem if it would belong to the Western sphere of influence. By referring to 
the views of Western representatives, considers this an irony of fate, he concludes that 
because of its earlier territorial losses, in the Western sphere of influence Hungary would 
look for a territorial revision in the face of its neighbours, and thus a constant danger of 
conflict would appear in this part of Europe (7D2 UMA, 5.7., 6.9.1957). 
 
Conclusion 
In the paper I have demonstrated the difficulties of tracing spheres of influence. As 
Susanna Hast (2012: 287) has noted, influence as such is not pejorative, but the “sphere” 
is something clearly negative. Indeed, ”sphere” is something final and exclusive in 
political life, and as such it is full of illocutions. Historically the concept is usually linked 
to the rise of imperialism in the 19th Century, but already in 1494 Spain and Portugal 
divided the newly discovered lands between themselves driven by similar considerations. 
After the Cold War, the concept seemed to go into the dustbin of history. Mechanisms of 
power have become more sophisticated. Nevertheless, Russia’s recent activity, and 
particularly its denied activity in Ukraine, have kept the term on the agenda. In present-
day usage the concept is directed at political opponents as a negative remark, as seen in 
the debate between Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (at the time) Sergei Lavrov and 
former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt (see e.g. Bloomberg, 2015). No doubt, 
European Neighbourhood Policy sounds better, but arguments such “we are only 
responding to the demands of these countries” may ring hollow in ears on the other side 
of the debate.  
In general the concept seems to belong to a grey zone of politics. Sphere of 
influence is a kind of paradox, which might exist but cannot be publicly recognized. Even 
if its potential existence might have an impact on behaviour, its public admittance would 
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restrict one’s political room for manoeuvre. On the basis of the cases studied here, I 
propose that it is usually the actor with the weaker bargaining position (at the time, and 
in the given context), such as Bismarck in 1884, Stalin in 1939, or Churchill in 1944, who 
tries to save as much as possible by seeking to formalise recognition for one’s sphere. 
From this point of view, it may be interesting to consider the statement attributed to 
former Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski, according to whom Putin proposed to 
divide Ukraine when Poland’s then Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Moscow in 2008. 
Sikorski himself, however, cancelled his statement a few days later, and said that “some 
of the words have been over-interpreted” (RT 21.10.2014; cf. Reuters 20.10.2014). 
As to when Hungary was at stake in 1956, we cannot find many references in the 
IR textbooks to its case. Neither to spheres of influence, nor to 1956 itself. Every now 
and then Hungary is present in IR textbooks, but mostly in lists of newly acceded EU and 
NATO member countries. Sometimes the situation of the Hungarian economy, and even 
the Jobbik party are mentioned, as well as the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia 
concerning the Gabčikovo dam issue (Kupchan 2013: 154, 173; Keukeleire-Delreux 
2014: 315-318; Pinker, 2011: 269). Perhaps the silence about the events of 1956 may 
reflect in part that the outcome is in a sense recognised as inevitable and thus natural, with 
reference to a Soviet sphere of interest, although further research may be required to 
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